Features
Base OS: Arch Linux. This page lists mechanisms in the tree — not Android / GrapheneOS kernel sandboxing, and not claims we cannot back with a file path or a test.
Exploit mitigations
RUNTIME- mallochardened_malloc shipped, opt-in (
cicada-malloc on) — global preload breaks Helium - Kernellinux-hardened boot entry + lockdown on that entry
- Memoryinit_on_alloc / init_on_free on cmdline
- CETibt + shstk where silicon supports it — not MTE
Permissions
SCOPES- DefaultUnknown apps: NETWORK/FILES deny
- MIC/CAMPer-app deny + system software kill
- PortalFILES=portal ≈ Downloads + picker
- VPN-onlyHost net only while wg0 is up
AFU / coercion
LOCK- RebootAuto-reboot when locked (default 30 min)
- USBKernel
authorized_default=0while locked (USBGuard alongside); already-authorized devices keep working - DuressLUKS slot at power-on + session PAM path at
sudo; both erase keyslots and hard-reset - WatchdogHardware AFU ceiling when present
Browser / network
HELIUM- JITOff via managed policy
- TelemetryOff — sync, metrics, DoH theater cut
- VPNWireGuard + nftables kill switch (opt-in)
- MACRandomized; LLMNR/mDNS off
Will not claim
HARD GAPS- MTENo x86 equivalent — do not list as done
- AuditorNo Titan — Pixel pin of TPM quote is the substitute
- Qubesbwrap scopes ≠ Xen compartments
- AV killSoftware cam/mic kill ≠ hardware cut